We consider the problem of securing a multicast network against a wiretapper that can eavesdrop on the packets on a limited number of network edges of its choice. We assume that the network employs network coding to simultaneously deliver the packets available at the source to all the destinations. We show that this problem can be looked at as a network generalization of the wiretap channel of type II introduced in a seminal paper by Ozarow and Wyner. In particular, we show that the transmitted information can be secured by using the Ozarow-Wyner approach of coset coding at the source on top of the existing network code. This way, we quickly and transparently recover some of the results available in the literature on secure network coding for wiretap networks. Moreover, we use this framework to derive new bounds on the code alphabet size that are independent of the network size, and provide algorithms for explicit construction of secure network codes. We also analyze the amount of information that can be leaked to the wiretapper as a function of the number of wiretapped edges.
I. INTRODUCTION
C ONSIDER a communication network represented by a directed graph with unit capacity edges and an information source that multicasts information to destinations located at distinct nodes. Assume that the minimum size of a cut that separates the source and each destination node is . It is known that a multicast rate of is achievable by using a linear network coding scheme [2] , [3] . In this paper, we focus on secure multicast connections in the presence of a wiretapper that can observe data on a limited number of edges of its choice. Our primary goal is to design a network coding scheme that delivers data at maximum rate to all the destinations and does not reveal any information about the transmitted message to the wiretapper.
The problem of making a linear network code information-theoretically secure in the presence of a wiretaper that can observe at a bounded number, say , of network edges was first studied by Cai and Yeung [4] . They considered directed graphs and constructed codes over an alphabet with at least elements which can support a secure multicast rate of up to . In [5] , they proved that these codes use the minimum amount of randomness required to achieve the security constraint. However, the algorithm due to [4] has high computational complexity and requires a very large field size (exponential in the number of wiretapped edges). Feldman et al. derived tradeoffs between security, code alphabet size, and multicast rate of secure linear network coding schemes in [6] , by using ideas from secret sharing and abstracting the network topology. Another approach was taken by Jain [7] who obtained security by exploiting the topology of the underlying network. Weakly secure network codes that insure that no "meaningful" information is revealed to the adversary were studied by Bhattad and Narayanan [8] .
A related line of work considers a more powerful Byzantine adversary that can also modify the packets on the edges it controls. Such an adversary can be potentially more harmful in networks that employ network coding because a modification in one packet can propagate throughout the network and affect other packets as well. Secure network coding in the presence of a Byzantine adversary has been studied by Ho et al. in [9] and Jaggi et al. [10] - [12] . In [11] and [12] , the authors devise distributed polynomial-time algorithms that are rate optimal and achieve information theoretical security against several scenarios of adversarial attacks.
The problem of error correction in networks was also studied by Cai and Yeung [13] , [14] , where they generalized classical error-correction coding techniques to network settings. A different model for error correction was introduced by Koetter and Kschischang [15] , where communication is established by transmitting subspaces instead of vectors through the network. The use of rank-metric codes for error control under this model was investigated in [16] . The common approach in these works is to encode packets at the source, prior to sending them over the network, using an error correcting code so that the packets carry not only data but also some redundant information derived from the data which will help to reduce the probability of a decoding error.
We consider the coding at the source technique to be a natural approach for addressing the information-theoretic security of wiretap networks. In a network where the min-cut value between the source and each destination node is and an adversary can access up to edges of its choice, we introduce a coding at source scheme that ensures information-theoretic security based where the min-cut between s and R is equal to n. All edges in the network have unit capacities. The maximum information rate that can be transmitted from s to R is n and can be achieved by routing the data over n edge-disjoint paths P ; . . . ; P . (b) Block diagram of the wiretap channel II [17] , [18] . The transmitter (TX) has an information source S that needs to be sent to a receiver (RX). The channel between the two is error-free and can transmit n symbols Y = (y ; . . . ; y ) per channel use among which can be observed by the eavesdropper. The maximum secure rate can be shown to be equal to n 0 . on the Ozarow-Wyner wiretap channel of type II [see Fig. 1 [17] and [18] , where the source transmits symbols to the destination and an adversary can access any of those symbols.
Ozarow and Wyner showed that the maximum number of symbols (say ) that the source can communicate to the destination securely in the information-theoretic sense is equal to . They also showed how to encode the source symbols into the channel symbols for secure transmission. Clearly, if the channel symbols are multicast over a network using a routing scheme, the source symbols remain secure in the presence of an adversary with access to any edges. We will illustrate later that this is not necessarily the case when network coding is used. However, we will show that a network code based on the Ozarow-Wyner scheme that preserves security of the source symbols, which are coded into the multicast symbols, can be designed over a sufficiently large field.
Using observations made by Feldman et al. [6] , we show that our scheme is equivalent to the one proposed in the pioneering work of Cai and Yeung [4] . However, with our approach, we can quickly and transparently recover some of the results available in the literature on secure network coding for wiretapped networks. The algorithm due to [4] is based on the code construction proposed by Li et al. [3] ; however, more efficient network coding algorithms have been proposed recently (see, e.g., [19] and [20] ). We use the results on the encoding complexity of the network coding presented in [20] - [22] to derive new bounds on the required field size of a secure network code that are independent of the number of edges in the network and that depend only on the number of source symbols and the number of destinations. We also propose an algorithm for constructing a secure network code that achieves these bounds. Furthermore, we look at the dual problem and analyze the security of a given Ozarow-Wyner code by studying the amount of information that can be gained by the wiretapper as a function of the number of wiretapped edges.
Parts of the results presented in this paper were published in [1] and were later extended in [23] and [24] by Silva and Kschischang to construct universal secure network codes based on maximum rank-distance (MRD) codes, and by Mills et al. [25] to achieve secrecy for wireless erasure networks. This paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we briefly review the model for the Ozarow-Wyner wiretap channel of type II. In Section III, we introduce the network generalization of this problem. In Section IV, we present an algorithm for secure network code design and establish new bounds on the required code alphabet size. In Section V, we study the security of Ozarow-Wyner codes. In Section VI, we highlight some connections of this work to previous literature. Finally, we conclude in Section VII with a summary of our results and open problems.
II. WIRETAP CHANNEL II
To motivate our approach, we first consider the special case of unicast networks characterized by a single destination, and draw connection to the classical wiretap channel of type II. To this end, we model the network as a directed acyclic graph with unit capacity edges, an information source and one destination node . We assume that the value of the min-cut between and is equal to . Therefore, by the max-flow min-cut theorem, the maximum information rate between and is equal to . This rate can be achieved using a routing scheme that sends the data on edge-disjoint paths in the network [see Fig. 1 (a)] [26] . We are interested in the scenario where some edges in the network are compromised by an eavesdropper who can observe of them in total. The observed edges are not known a priori. The goal is to maximize the information rate from to without revealing any information about the data to the eavesdropper. We assume that there is no shared randomness between the source and the destination.
When a routing scheme is used, the eavesdropper will observe at most messages among the messages routed on the different paths. Thus, the network problem becomes equivalent to a point-to-point scenario known as the Wiretap Channel II (WTCII) 1 depicted in Fig. 1 (b) and which was originally studied by Ozarow and Wyner [17] , [18] . In the WTCII model, a transmitter can send symbols (per channel use) to a destination in the presence of an eavesdropper that can observe any of those symbols. Under this setting, it was shown that the maximum number of packets that the source can communicate to the destination securely in an information-theoretic sense is equal to . The problem can be mathematically formulated as follows. Let denote the random vector associated with the information symbols that the source wishes to send securely. We assume that is uniformly distributed over , where is the Galois field . An encoder encodes the information into the random vector corresponding to the symbols transmitted to the receiver through the noiseless channel. The receiver obtains a perfect copy of with no errors. The eavesdropper observes transmitted symbols which we denote by the vector . When , there exists an encoding scheme, that we refer to as the WTCII code or coset code, which satisfies the following two requirements. 1) Perfect secrecy: the eavesdropper does not gain any information about from its observations, i.e.:
(1)
2) Recoverability: the receiver can completely recover the information from the received message , i.e.:
(2)
Example 1: Consider a WTCII with that can transmit two bits and , where one of them is observed by the wiretapper, i.e.,
. By the previous result, this channel can be used to transmit at most bit securely to the receiver. A coding scheme that can achieve this rate can be constructed as follows. If the source bit is 0, then is chosen to be either or with equal probability. If the source bit is 1, then is chosen to be either or with equal probability. This scheme is summarized in the following table:
It can be seen that the knowledge of either bit or does not reveal any information about the information bit , whereas the knowledge of both and is sufficient to completely determine , namely by computing (addition is modulo 2).
In general, the maximum secure rate of symbols can be achieved by a linear coding scheme based on an maximal distance separable (MDS) code over a large field . The code partitions the space of all possible transmitted vectors into cosets. Then, the encoder outputs a vector chosen uniformly at random from the coset that corresponds to the syndrome . In other words, if is the parity check matrix of the code , then is chosen uniformly at random among all solutions to the linear system . The decoder can recover the information symbols by simply computing the syndrome of the received codeword. By observing symbols, the eavesdropper cannot gain any information about , due to the MDS property of the code. Indeed, the MDS code achieves the Singleton bound, and therefore, the minimum distance of each coset is . Thus, the vectors of length that agree with the observations of the eavesdropper must all belong to distinct cosets. For instance, the scheme of the aforementioned example can be seen to be based on the MDS repetition code with parity check matrix .
III. WIRETAP NETWORK II
We consider now the more general problem of security in multicast networks, i.e., networks with more than one destina-tion, building on the insights from the WTCII. A multicast network is modeled as a directed acyclic graph with unit capacity edges and a source node . The network has destinations, and the value of the min-cut between the source and each destination is equal to . Each destination demands all the data available at the source, and a linear network code is used to satisfy these demands. A wiretapper can observe edges in the network, and our goal is to maximize the multicast rate to all destinations under a perfect information-theoretic secrecy constraint. That is, the wiretapper should not be able to learn any information about the transmitted message even if it had infinite computation power. We assume that the wiretapper knows the implemented network code, i.e., all the coefficients of the linear combinations that determine the packets on each edge. Moreover, we assume that there is no shared randomness between the source and the destinations.
As seen in the previous section, in a unicast network ( ), the source can transmit at a rate of symbols securely by first applying a secure wiretap channel code mapping information symbols into encoded symbols which are then routed to the destination. For general multicast networks, when security is not an issue, we know that a multicast rate is possible using a linear network code [2] , [3] . It is interesting to see whether the source can securely multicast symbols to each destination using a wiretap channel code at the source. Naturally, this would be true if a multicast rate of can be achieved just by routing the information to all the destinations. In the following example, we show that the multicast rate of can be achieved in the butterfly network with two terminals.
Example 2 (Butterfly Network):
Consider the butterfly network shown in Fig. 2 with two destination nodes and . In this network, the min-cut between the source and each destination is . A wiretapper can observe the messages on a single edge in the network, i.e.,
. Let be the maximum secure rate that the source can achieve to each destination separately. If the source applies the wiretap channel code of Example 1 with the classical network code as in Fig. 2(a) , the wiretapper will be able to learn the source symbol if it taps into any of the edges , , or , since they always carry the source symbols . Therefore, a network code can break down a secure wiretap channel code. However, if the network code is modified so that node D combines its inputs over, e.g., and the coding vector of edge is , where is a primitive element of , the wiretap channel code remains secure, and the wiretapper cannot gain any information by accessing any single edge in the network. Note that the wiretap channel code based on the MDS code with remains secure with any network code where the coding vector on edge is linearly independent of . We proceed to discuss the general case of an arbitrary network topology. We will show that the source can transmit symbols securely if it first applies a secure wiretap channel code with a parity check matrix , provided that the network code is such that no linear combination of coding vectors belongs to the space spanned by the rows of . Let denote the set of edges that the wiretapper chooses to observe, and the random variable as- sociated with the packets carried by the edges in . Let denote the matrix whose rows are the coding vectors associated with the observed edges in . As in the case of the wiretap channel, let be the random variable uniformly distributed over that is associated with the information symbols the source wishes to send securely. In addition, let be the random variable associated with the output of the wiretap channel code. The symbols forming are multicast through the network using a linear network code. Writing in two different forms, and taking into account the recoverability condition of (2), we get (3) The unit of entropies and conditional entropies is taken to be , where the underlying finite field is . Our objective is to conceal all the information data from the wiretapper. The perfect secrecy condition (1) implies Thus we obtain from (3)
Equation (6) follows from the fact that is a deterministic function of . Since is uniformly distributed over , and since is picked uniformly at random from the coset having as syndrome, it follows that is uniformly distributed over . Therefore, we have in (7) and . Moreover, by Theorem 7.3 in [28, p. 119 ]. Now, taking , we get (8) for all possible choices of the set of wiretapped edges . The maximum value for is and corresponds, for instance, to the case where the wiretapped edges belong to a mincut. Therefore, the maximum rate for secure transmission is bounded as When a secure coset code with a parity check matrix is used, we have by [28, Th. 7.3] , that . Therefore, by (7) , for any scheme of rate to be secure, it should satisfy the following condition: (9) That is, the rowspaces of and should always intersect trivially. This condition can be simplified by noticing that it suffices to consider only the sets whose corresponding matrix is of maximum rank. The security condition becomes (10) For the scheme that achieves the maximum rate , the security condition of (10) becomes (11) The previous analysis proves the following theorem:
Theorem 1:: Let be an acyclic multicast network with min-cut value between the source and each destination equal to , and unit capacity edges among which at most are observed by a wiretapper. Assuming a uniformly distributed information source, the maximum secure multicast rate under a perfect secrecy constraint is . This maximum rate can be achieved by using a coset code at the source described by a parity check matrix , and a linear network code satisfying the condition in (11) . That is, no linear combination of vectors belongs to the space spanned by the rows of . A wiretapper that can observe more than edges will have uncertainty about the source smaller than .
Note that if the network code is such that there are different edges each carrying the symbols (with no linear mixing), then the coset code defined by the parity check matrix satisfying (11) has to be an MDS code since, in particular, it has to guarantee security for the WTCII. Next, we give an application of the previous theorem to the family of combination networks illustrated in Fig. 3 .
Example 3 (Combination Networks): A combination network
is defined over a three-partite graph comprising three layers. The first layer consists of the source node , the second consists of intermediate nodes , and the last layer is formed by destination nodes each connected to a different set of nodes of the second layer. 
Consider a combination network
, where a wiretapper eavesdrops on edges. A secure linear network code for this network can be obtained in the following way. First, let be a primitive element of , and a generator matrix of a Reed-Solomon code, where . Take the first rows of to be the network code defined by the matrix and the last rows to form the matrix .
Therefore, the information vector , is encoded using a secure wiretap channel code that uses parity check matrix . The obtained encoded vector is then transmitted to the destinations using the linear network code defined by , i.e., the encoding vector on edge is the th row vector of and nodes simply forward their incoming messages. Note that any row vectors of are linearly independent. Therefore, the matrix satisfies the condition of Theorem 1, and that any destination can decode the message and the message is protected from wiretapping.
IV. ALPHABET SIZE AND CODE DESIGN
We have seen in Example 2 that the field has to be enlarged from to in order to address the security requirement. In the non-secure scenario, Jaggi et al. showed that a field with size larger or equal to the number of destinations is sufficient for constructing linear multicast network codes [19] . However, this may not be the case if the network code is required to be secure. The original code construction of Cai and Yeung [4] requires a field of exponential size. Namely, the field size must be larger than , where is the number of edges in the network. Moreover, their construction requires steps, which is exponentially large in . Feldman et al. showed that there exist networks that require a field of size at least for this construction [6] .
A common characteristic of these works is decoupling the security problem from the multicast data delivery problem. First, a network code is constructed, and then it is made secure using an additional code at the source. In this section, we take a different approach by addressing the security requirements while constructing the code. We obtain a polynomial time algorithm that constructs a secure network code using a small alphabet (whose size is independent of the number of edges in the network). First, we show that the linear information flow (LIF) algorithm [19] can be modified to obtain a secure multicast code. While the modified version has exponential running time, it requires a smaller alphabet size then in [4] . Then, in Section IV-B, we show a further modification that allows to achieve a polynomial running time.
A. Secure LIF Algorithm
The LIF algorithm due to Jaggi et al. [19] is a polynomial time algorithm for finding linear network codes for multicast networks. The input to the algorithm includes the network , the source , and destinations. Assuming the min-cut between the source and each destination is , the algorithm outputs a linear network code that delivers information at rate to all the destinations. In this section, we show how to modify this algorithm to construct a secure network code. The resulting algorithm, referred to as the secure linear information flow (SLIF) Algorithm, is depicted in Fig. 4 . The key component of Algorithm SLIF is an additional step (Step 10-b) that addresses the security requirement.
The algorithm receives, as input, a parity check matrix which determines the secure wiretap channel code that will be used at the source. The matrix must be a full-rank matrix. We denote by the set of row vectors of and by the subspace spanned by vectors in .
First, the algorithm finds a set of disjoint paths between and , for each destination . Receiver is also associated with a set that includes the most recently visited edges for each of the paths in . We denote by the global encoding vector of edge and by the set of global encoding vectors that correspond to the set .
Next, the algorithm visits the edges in in topological order. We denote by the set of edges that have been visited prior to the current iteration. In each iteration, the algorithm assigns the global encoding vector of the currently processed edge as a linear combination of the global encoding vectors of edges in , where is the set of incoming edges of the tail node of . Vector must satisfy the following two conditions. 1) For each destination , it holds that is a set of linearly independent vectors. 2) For each of size that satisfies , it holds that . To find the global encoding vector for the currently visited edge that satisfies conditions 1 and 2 we can use the techniques described in [19] . To satisfy condition 2, we first need to check whether for each it holds that . If yes, the condition 2 will be satisfied for any choice of . If not, we impose the additional constraint when selecting the global encoding vector of . Condition 1 ensures that each terminal receives independent linear combinations of the data packets and thus can recover the original data. Finally, condition 2 ensures that the network code is secure. Indeed after edge has been processed, for each of size it holds that (12) This implies that after the execution of the algorithm for each set that includes edges, it holds that , which, in turn, implies that the security condition of Example 11 is satisfied.
It was shown in [19, Lemma 8] that, for the LIF algorithm, a field of size larger or equal to is sufficient for guaranteeing that each set , contains linearly independent vectors. In Algorithm SLIF, the total number of sets that need to be kept independent is upper bounded by . Thus, by the same lemma, we obtain the following improved bound on the alphabet size for secure network codes.
Theorem 2:
Let be an acyclic network with unit capacity edges and an information source such that the min-cut value to each of the destinations is equal to . A secure multicast at rate in the presence of a wiretapper who can observe at most edges is possible over the alphabet of size (13) Lemma 1: The computational complexity of Algorithm SLIF is by , where . Proof: The running time of the algorithm due to [19] is equal to . Algorithm SLIF performs the same steps as the algorithm due to [19] . In addition, in Step 10-b, a security condition is verified for each subset of length . Finding the global encoding vector at Step 10 that satisfies the two conditions (a) and (b) requires time per iteration or time for all iterations, where (see [19, Lemma 7] ). We conclude that the computational complexity of the algorithm is .
B. Secure Minimal Network Algorithm
From the previous discussion, it can be seen that the bound on the alphabet size could be improved by counting the number of sets of edges in the network that carry distinct linear combinations. While this may be hard in general, good estimates can be obtained using the results of Langberg et al. [21] , [22] on the upper bound on the minimum number of encoding edges. An encoding edge, as opposed to a forwarding edge, creates new packets by combining, i.e., forming linear combinations of, the packets received on the incoming edges of its tail node. Thus, the number of different linear combinations transmitted by network edges is upper bounded by the number of encoding edges in the network. In particular, Langberg et al. [21] showed that for any acyclic network topology, there exists a network code with at most encoding edges. The follow-up work in [22] presents an efficient polynomialtime algorithm that given an original network constructs an auxiliary network that has the following properties.
1) The number of edges of is bounded 2 by . 2) For any feasible network code for , there exists a corresponding feasible network code for that uses the same linear combinations as the network code for . 2 Langberg et al. [22] state that the size of the network is bounded by O(n t ), however, a more detailed analysis of [22, Th. 6] implies that the size of the network is bounded by 2n t . 3) Given a secure network code for , the corresponding secure network code for can be obtained through an efficient procedure. We combine the algorithm in [22] with the SLIF algorithm of the previous section to obtain the secure minimal network (SMN) algorithm for constructing secure network codes. The formal description of Algorithm SMN is presented in Fig. 5 .
The main idea of Algorithm SMN is first to construct the auxiliary network using the procedure described in [22] , then find a secure network code using the SLIF algorithm described earlier and then use the procedure described in [22] to find the corresponding network code for the original network . Since the network code for uses the same linear combinations as the network code for , the security properties of the network code for carry over to the network code for .
Since the number of edges of the auxiliary network is bounded by , Theorem 2 implies the following bound on the required field size. . Proof: Finding the minimal network in Step 1 of the SMN algorithm takes time [22] . The number of edges in the resulting network is bounded by . By Lemma 1, finding the network code in Step 2 requires time, where . Thus, the computational complexity of Algorithm SMN is .
Note that the running time of Algorithm SMN is polynomial in and .
C. Special Case:
For the special case when the min-cut , such as in the butterfly network, we can completely settle the question on the alphabet size of a secure network code. Note that the adversary has to be limited to observing at most one edge ( ). Based on the work of Fragouli and Soljanin [20] , the coding problem for these networks is equivalent to coloring a special graph, where colors correspond to points on the projective line , namely (15) with being a primitive element of . In this case, the authors showed that the field of size is sufficient and showed that for certain networks it is impossible to construct a feasible network code over a smaller field [20, Th. 8] . Clearly, a secure code can be obtained by reducing the set of available colors in (15) by removing the point (color) and applying a wiretap code based on the matrix as in Example 2. Therefore, we obtain the following bound on the alphabet size for secure network codes for .
Theorem 3: For multicast networks with destinations and min-cut , the code alphabet of size is sufficient for a secure network code. There exist networks for which it is necessary.
V. WIRETAPPER EQUIVOCATION
In this section, we analyze the performance of coset codes when the wiretapper strength represented by the number (the number of edges it can observe) is not known in advance. In this case, we want to find for a given coset code the amount of leaked information as a function of the number of compromised edges . This is captured by the equivocation of the wiretapper representing its uncertainty about the information source vector and which is defined as in [18] based on a worst-case scenario to be (16) where is the random variable representing the observed packets on the set of wiretapped edges. We have , where is a matrix, and is the output of the coset code satisfying . The case of interest is when , since otherwise . Therefore, in the expression of the equivocation, we can focus on the sets carrying linearly independent packets, so that can be written as:
Therefore, we will assume from now on without loss of generality that is such that . For a given choice of such , we denote by be the parity check matrix of the code generated by . Theorem 4 gives the expression of that depends on the linear network code and the coset code used.
Theorem 4: Assuming a uniformly distributed information source , the equivocation of a wiretapper accessing edges when a coset code based on a parity check matrix is used at the source is given by (18) Proof: Let the matrix which satisfies . Let be a full rank matrix such that , where is the identity matrix. It is always possible to find such matrix by column reduction on , since Therefore, we have Therefore, using (3) and the fact that is uniformly distributed over , the equivocation at the wiretapper can be written as (19) Note that when , we recover the result of Theorem 1. A relevant concept to the analysis here is that of the generalized Hamming weights of a linear code which was introduced by Wei [29] , and that characterize the performance of coset codes over the classical wiretap channel of type II. The generalized Hamming weights were extended to the wiretap networks setting in [30] . Given a certain network with an associated network and coset codes, Theorem 4 provides an equivalent expression of the network formulation of the th generalized Hamming weight as the minimum number of edges that need to be wiretapped to leak units of information to the wiretapper. Then, we can write (20) Next, we give three applications of the previous theorem. First, we show how it implies a classical result for the wiretap channel of type II. Second, we consider the case where the wiretapper may gain access to more edges than what the coset code achieving perfect secrecy is provisioned for. Third, we study the scenario where only a subset of the network edges are vulnerable to wiretapping.
A. Wiretap Channel
We show how Theorem 4 can be used to recover a classical result on the wiretapper equivocation rate for the wiretap channel of type II [17, Lemma 4.2] , which is given in the following corollary.
Corollary 2: For the wiretap channel of type II, the equivocation rate of the eavesdropper is given by (21) where denote the th column of the parity check matrix of the coset code.
Proof: The wiretap channel of type II is equivalent to a network formed of only two vertices, the source and the destination , which are connected by edges of unit capacities. To ensure security, the source employs a coset code that outputs coded symbols . Assume that the edges between the source and the destination are indexed from 1 to such that edge carries symbol , and let be the edge set. For any , define to be the matrix formed by the rows of the identity matrix indexed by the elements of in an increasing order. Since edge carries the packet , for a given set of wiretapped edges, and , where . Therefore, the matrix consists of the column vectors of indexed by . Therefore, by Theorem 4, we get the equivocation rate of the wiretapper (22) 
B. Underestimated Wiretapper
A coset code based on a parity check matrix can guarantee perfect secrecy when the observation of the wiretapper is limited to edges. However, there is no guarantee, in general, that more than edges will not be compromised. In this case, it is desirable that the used secure code has a smooth performance degradation. We will show in what follows that the codes constructed in Section III have this property.
Suppose the coset code defined by the parity check matrix satisfies Theorem 1 and achieves a secure rate and guarantees perfect secrecy against a wiretapper that can observe at most edges. If, however, the wiretapper can access edges, then the amount of information leaked to the wiretapper can be shown to be equal to , i.e., the number of additional wiretapped edges.
Corollary 3: Consider a multicast network satisfying the assumptions of Theorem 1 employing a secure wiretap code at the source that can achieve perfect secrecy when at most edges in the network are wiretapped. If the wiretapper observes edges, its equivocation is given by Proof: Since the coset code achieves perfect secrecy for wiretapped edges, we have and (3) implies The minimum value of is obtained when has maximal rank, i.e., when .
C. Restricted Wiretapper
When the network is large, the wiretapper may not have access to all the network, and his choice of edges is limited to a small subset among the network edges. For this model, the equivocation rate of the wiretapper is determined by (18) by replacing with . In many cases, the min cuts of a network represent its most vulnerable part, due for example to the geographical proximity of its constituent edges, or to the fact that its edges always carry independent information which makes it attractive from the wiretapper perspective. The next theorem evaluates the performance of a coset code for a restricted wiretapper who can observe edges in a set formed by the edges in a min cut.
Corollary 4: For a wiretapper restricted to observing any edges in a min cut between the source and a destination, the equivocation of the wiretapper is given by (23) where is the ith column of the matrix and is the matrix whose rows are the global encoding vectors of the edges in the considered min cut.
Proof: Assume the edges that are vulnerable to wiretapping are indexed from 1 to , so that . Let denote the packets carried by those edges, such that edge carries packet . We can write , with being an invertible matrix; otherwise, there is at least one destination that cannot decode . For any choice of wiretapped edges, with , the symbols observed by the wiretapper can be written as , where is the matrix formed by the row vectors of indexed by . It can be easily checked that . Therefore, by Theorem 4
The result then follows by noticing that is formed by the column vectors of indexed by .
Corollary 4 says that the performance of a coset code with parity check matrix for a wiretapper restricted to a mincut characterized by a coding matrix is same as a coset code of parity check matrix used on the classical wiretap channel of type II. Note that this result still holds whenever the subset of possible wiretapped edges is such that the matrix is invertible. For this scenario, the equivocation rate of the wiretapper can be alternatively given by the generalized Hamming weights [29] of the linear code generated by . In this case, for a given , is the unique solution to the following inequalities [29, Cor. A]:
VI. CONNECTIONS TO OTHER SCHEMES
In this section, we explore the relationship between the proposed scheme and previously known constructions [4] , [23] , [31] , [32] .
A. Cai and Yeung's Scheme
Cai and Yeung were first to study the design of secure network codes for multicast networks [4] . They showed that, in the setting described earlier, a secure network code can be found for any
. Their construction consists of the following steps.
1) Generate the random keys vector by choosing its components uniformly at random over . 2) Form the vector by concatenating the random keys with the source symbols :
3) "Mix" the data with the keys using an invertible matrix to obtain the vector . 4) Send to all the destinations using a linear the constructed code. Feldman et al. also studied the design of secure network codes in [6] and showed that the above construction leads to a secure code whenever the matrix satisfy the following security conditions [6, Th. 6]: any set of vectors consisting of 1) at most linearly independent edge coding vectors and/or 2) any number of vectors from the first rows of is linearly independent. We will now show that our approach based on secure codes for the WTCII is equivalent to the scheme [4] when the aforementioned conditions are satisfied.
Proposition 1: For any matrix satisfying the security conditions defined earlier, the matrix formed by taking the first rows of satisfies the condition of Theorem 1.
Proof: Consider the secure multicast scheme of Cai and Yeung described earlier. For a given information vector , let be the set of all possible vectors that could be multicast through the network under this scheme. This set can be written as Then, for all , we have Therefore, any also belongs to the coset of the space spanned by the rows of whose syndrome is equal to . Moreover, since is invertible, implying that the set is exactly that coset. The security conditions on then directly translate into condition (11) of Theorem 1.
B. Universal Secure Network Codes
For practical implementations of linear multicast network codes over , the information sources are typically packets of a certain length , i.e., are vectors in . Applying our approach presented in a preliminary version of this paper [1] , Silva and Kschischang devised in [23] a scheme that achieves a complete decoupling between the secure code and the network code design. Their scheme is universal in the sense that the coset code will always achieve secrecy irrespective of the linear network code used. The main idea is to choose the parity check matrix of this coset code to be that of an MRD code. MRD codes are a special class of MDS codes which are nonlinear over but linear over the extension field . The parity check matrix of an MRD code over , has the interesting property that it always satisfies the condition of Theorem 1 when the edge coding vectors are over , as stated previously. Therefore, MRD codes will always achieve perfect secrecy irrespective of the network code used. The choice of the MRD code will only depend on the underlying field of the network code.
VII. CONCLUSION
We considered the problem of securing a multicast network implementing network coding against a wiretapper capable of observing a limited number of edges of his choice, as defined initially by Cai and Yeung [28] . We showed that the problem can be formulated as a generalization of the wiretap channel of type II which was introduced and studied by Ozarow and Wyner, and decomposed into two subproblems: the first one consists of designing a secure wiretap channel code, or a coset code, and the second consists of designing a network code satisfying some additional constraints. We proved there is no penalty to pay by adopting this separation, which we find in many ways illuminative. Moreover, this approach allowed us to derive new bounds on the required alphabet size for secure codes. These new bounds differ from those in the literature in that they are independent from the network size and are functions of only the number of information symbols and the number of destinations. We also analyzed the performance of the proposed coset codes under various wiretapper scenarios.
A number of interesting questions related to this problem remain open. For instance, the bounds presented here on the code alphabet size can be large in certain cases and it is worthy to investigate whether tighter bounds exist. Another issue which was not addressed in this paper is that of designing efficient decoding algorithms at the destinations which can be important in practice. Also, the work of Silva and Kschischang [23] hinted at some advantages of nonlinear codes. The benefits of nonlinearity in security applications, whether at the source code or at the network code level, are still to be better understood.
